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STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES UNDER
ATTACK- CASUALTIES IN THE BATTLE FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL-MITE CORP. V. DIXON
Before this Note went to print the Supreme Court affirmed the
Seventh Circuit's decision in MITE Corp. v. Dixon, solely on the
ground that the Illinois Business Take-Over Act impermissibly bur-
dened interstate commerce. The Court properly objected to the
Illinois Act's overly broad jurisdictional reach, but it left other
issues undecided, most notably, whether the Williams Act pre-
empted Illinois' approach to regulating tender offers. This Note
examines the Seventh Circuit's resolution of these issues, including
those left undecided by the Supreme Court, and considers the
threat that the Seventh Circuit decision poses to the viability of
other state takeover laws, significantly those laws whose jurisdic-
tional provision does not burden interstate commerce.
INTRODUCTION
In MITE Corp. v. Dixon,' the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
invalidated the Illinois Business Take-Over Act2 because it conflicted with
the federal scheme for regulating tender offers under the Williams Act 3 and
it unduly burdened interstate commerce. Several other state takeover laws
have also been successfully challenged on identical grounds, 4 and conse-
quently, the validity of other state takeover laws is in doubt.5 Whether
1. 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), affd, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 50 U.S.L.W. 4767 (U.S. June
23, 1982) (No. 80-1188) (Illinois Take-over Act unconstitutional under commerce clause because
burden Act imposes on interstate commerce exceeds local interests in protecting resident security
holders and regulating internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 12112, §§ 137.51-70 (1979).
3. Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)(1976). See notes 34-41 and accompa-
nying text infra.
4. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd oi the
grounds sub nora. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho act); Brascan
Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-82] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,247 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 1979)
(Louisiana act); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware act);
Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51, 302 N.W.2d 596 (1981) (Michigan act; except as to
corporations having less than $1,000,000 in assets or less than 500 shareholders, and as to anti-
fraud provisions). But see AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio
act upheld); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1980) (Delaware act upheld).
See also Freund & Volk, Tender Offers: Developments on Offense, in ELEVENTH INST. ON SEC.
REG. 1, 34 n.32 (1980).
5. The Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated new rules governing tender
offers which, if upheld, create a direct preemptive conflict between most state takeover acts and
the Williams Act. See note 14 infra. State acts challenged under the new rules have almost
universally been invalidated or enjoined. E.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1980) (New Jersey act enjoined); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981)
(enjoined Nevada act); Crane Co. v. Lan, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (enjoined Pennsyl-
vania act); Canadian Pac. Enter., Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (enjoined
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wholesale condemnation of state legislation is justified depends on the inter-
pretation given to the Williams Act. If, as the opinion in MITE implies, the
Act represents a comprehensive attempt to regulate tender offers," even the
most benign state efforts cannot be countenanced. Conversely, if the Act
merely sets minimum standards for tender offer regulation, 7 the states may
be free to enact more stringent, consistent legislation. Clearly, the purpose
ascribed to the Williams Act will have a significant impact on the limits of
state authority in this field.
Equally important in construing the Williams Act are the roles that the
state and federal governments must assume in regulating securities transac-
tions. An overbroad reading of Congress' purpose in enacting the Williams
Act may alter the cooperative approach that has long existed between the
states and the federal government. Federal securities laws have traditionally
emphasized disclosure as the best means of protecting investors, while state
blue sky and corporate laws have addressed more substantive aspects of
securities transactions within their separate jurisdictions. ° In recent years this
Ohio act); Hi-Shear Indus. v. Neiditz, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,805 (D. Conn. Dec.
16, 1980) (enjoined Connecticut act: anti-fraud provisions excepted); Hi-Shear Indus. v. Camp-
bell, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,804 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) (invalidated South Carolina
act); Eure v. Grand Metropolitan Ltd., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,694 (N.C. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 18, 1980) (invalidated North Carolina act). But see Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 121
N.H. 607, 433 A.2d 1250 (1981) (New Hampshire act upheld; 20 day pre-offer notice require-
ment does not conflict with Rule 14d-2(b) because dual compliance is "technically" possible). At
least one court has severely criticized the new rules as beyond the authority of the SEC to
promulgate. See Ohio v. SEC, [1979-80] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,286 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15,
1980).
6. See Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MABQ. L. REV. 687 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as State Regulation].
7. See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Compe-
tency, 62 COHNELL L. REv. 213, 248 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Langevoort]; Shipman, Some
Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 722, 756-61 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Shipman].
8. Long before federal entry into the field, the states regulated the issuance of securities and
certain forms of takeovers, at first indirectly by means of state corporation acts and later by
means of local blue sky laws governing the sale of securities within each state. See notes 103 &
104 infra. When Congress first began to regulate securities transactions, it specifically preserved
the right of the states to act in this field as long as the actions were consistent with federal law.
See note 162 infra. Since then state and federal statutes have supplemented each other in
regulating corporate and securities transactions. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.28
(1979) (governing voting of shares) with 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1976) (governing proxy solicita-
tions).
9. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe Industries,
minority shareholders, seeking to set aside a merger and recover the fair value of their stock,
brought an action under federal securities law. The Supreme Court held that § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 did not reach breaches of fiduciary duty among
shareholders because the federal statute merely assured that all relevant information be fur-
nished so shareholders could decide whether to accept or reject the terms of the merger. Under
the Delaware "short-form merger" statute governing the transaction, dissatisfied shareholders
were left to pursue the state appraisal remedy. The Court expressed a reluctance to extend the
federal securities laws if they "would overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate
law." Id. at 479.
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balance has taken on greater significance as a result of Supreme Court
decisions which have favored a more restrictive view of federal involve-
ment.' 0 Consequently, state law remedies have become increasingly impor-
tant in providing alternative forms of relief for injured shareholders." A
proper reading of the Williams Act must accommodate the crucial role of
local securities regulation with the overall structure of federal regulation,
and must not impose broad restrictions on state power which would under-
mine the authority states have traditionally exercised over a corporation's
internal affairs. 12
Thus, the decision in MITE has significance beyond the issue concerning
the validity of the Illinois Act. Because a majority of states have enacted
takeover laws,' 3 it is essential to critically evaluate the Seventh Circuit's
interpretation of the Williams Act and the impact the Act has on the balance
of state and federal authority in the field of securities law. Furthermore,
though the court's opinion was not based on the new tender offer rules
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commis-
sion),' 4 the preemption and interstate commerce principles developed in
MITE will continue to be significant in analyzing future court cases. Like-
10. Under Chief Justice Burger, Supreme Court decisions have sought to reduce the work-
load of the federal judiciary by limiting new causes of action under federal securities laws,
redefining the elements of those actions that were too well entrenched to be eliminated, and
creating new procedural obstacles to private enforcement efforts. E.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See Dickinson, Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Role of the
States in Securities Regulation, 65 Iow,% L. REV. 1201, 1201-02 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Jurisdiction].
During the past decade, the Supreme Court has significantly affected the level at which state
and federal governments participate in various substantive areas. In the field of securities
regulation, the Court has restricted federal involvement to a significant degree, leaving it to the
states to provide appropriate remedies in many cases. See Dickinson, supra , at 1201-02. In view
of the strong role the states have occupied for so long in regulating matters of a purely corporate
nature, the federal interest in this field is much more limited than that of the states. Conse-
quently, the level of conflict between local takeover laws and the Williams Act, between state
interests and federal interests, should reach a higher threshhold before the supremacy of federal
law is asserted. Minor inconsistencies are tolerable if, overall, the operation of both statutory
schemes can be reconciled. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127
(1973). See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
11. Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 10 at 1202.
12. See notes 198-200 and accompanying text infra. A state which has a legitimate interest in
regulating the internal affairs of a company organized under its laws would arguably have little
or no interest in controlling corporations that are merely present within the state, or that are
partially owned by residents of that state. But cf. Shipman, supra note 7, at 751-55 (such
expanded state control can be justified when foreign corporations have a substantial enough
presence within the regulating state).
13. See note 45 infra.
14. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to -101 (1980). The rules were promulgated pursuant to § 14(d)
of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976), to regulate activities related to the making of a
tender offer. Rule 14d-2, which defines the circumstances under which a tender offer is deemed
to have commenced, especially Rule 14d-2(b), which triggers a tender offer if specified informa-
tion is made public, raises the possibility of preemption for most state takeover acts. Whereas the
states generally require disclosure statements and a statutory waiting period before a tender offer
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wise, the validity of the new tender offer rules and the extent of the SEC's
rule-making authority may well depend, at least in part, on the extent of
state and federal power to govern corporate takeovers via tender offers.1 5
TENDER OFFER LEGISLATION BEFORE MITE
During the early 1960's the cash tender offer' 6 gained recognition as a
uniquely effective means of attaining control of a corporation. 7 In a cash
may commence, see notes 48-49 and accompanying text infra, Rule 14d-2(b) causes the offer to
become effective immediately upon publication of a press release, for example. Compliance with
both schemes is impossible when the state law requires the offeror to wait while the SEC requires
the offeror to proceed. The tender offer in MITE was made prior to the effective date of the new
rules which apply only to offers commenced on or after January 7, 1980.
15. See notes 202-19 and accompanying text infra.
16. The Williams Act failed to define "tender offer," leaving the courts with the responsibil-
ity of developing the meaning of the term. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598
(5th Cir.), cert., denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974). The meaning that has evolved encompasses a
greater range of activities than the drafters would have expected when the Williams bill was first
introduced. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); S-C Sec., Inc.
v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978); Cattlemen's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F.
Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972). In 1979 the SEC proposed a definition of tender offer that would
include stock purchases involving at least five percent of outstanding shares from 10 or more
stockholders within a 45-day period. Broadly publicized offers involving a specific premium over
the market price in which shareholders had no "meaningful" opportunity to negotiate price and
terms were also included within the definition. Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, 44 Fed. Reg.
70,349 (1979). See generally E. ARANOW, I-1. EINIIORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN
TENDER OFFERS 1-34 (1977); Einhorn & Blackburn, The Developinug Concept of "Tender Offer":
An Analysis of the Judicial and Adoministrative Interpretations of the Teriu, 23 N.Y.L. Scn. L.
REV. 379 (1978); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HlARv. L. REV. 1250 (1973); Note, Expansion of the Williams Act: Tender
Offer Regulation for Non-Conventional Purchases, 11 Loy. U. Cui. L.J. 277 (1980).
17. Prior to the 1960's tender offers were used primarily as a means for the issuer to
repurchase its own securities. See 1). AUSTIN & J. FIsIiMAN, CORioRATIONS IN CONFLIcr-TiE
TENDER OFFER 7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as D. AusTIN & J. FISIiMAN]. Several reasons have been
suggested for the emergence of tender offers as a takeover device:
1) Increased corporate liquidity and readily available credit;
2) Comparatively depressed price/earnings ratios, book values, and cash or quick
assets ratios, making acquisition via the tender offer more attractive;
3) Greater recognition, sophistication, and knowledge with respect to the takeover
via tender technique;
4) Lack of extensive federal or state regulation of tender offers;
5) Quicker and more successful results when compared with a full-dress proxy
contest;
6) Greater flexibility-the ability to hedge by reserving certain options against a
final and irrevocable commitment;
7) Psychology-the appeal to shareholders in straight dollars and cents language,
eliminating the need, as in a proxy contest, to convince the shareholder that the
insurgent can do a more efficient job;
8) Notwithstanding the actual capital investment, the reduced costs of effecting a
tender offer when compared with a proxy contest;
9) A new "respectability" for cash tender offers.
E. ARANOW & H. EINIIORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 65-66 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN].
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tender offer, the bidder made an offer to purchase a minimum number of the
company's outstanding shares within a specified period and at a fixed price,
usually at a premium over the market price. I8 The offer was made directly to
the shareholders; consequently, the need to deal with hostile management or
to engage in costly, drawn-out proxy contests was eliminated.' 9 Until 1968,
cash tender offers were essentially unregulated. 20 Their proponents viewed
them as serving a useful economic function, 21 but critics portrayed them as
acts of piracy resulting in the sacking and pillaging of "proud old compan-
ies."22 Such a portrayal was not entirely inaccurate. For example, conglom-
erates were sometimes more interested in the liquidation value of a company
whose stock was significantly undervalued. 23 Where a takeover by conven-
18. The higher price was intended as an inducement for shareholders to tender their shares.
But higher prices also provided an opportunity for market disruption when the offer was for less
than all outstanding shares. Market professionals could tender at the higher price such shares as
they owned along with any that could be borrowed or pledged. When the tender offer was
completed and the price returned to near its earlier level, the professionals went back into the
market and covered the 'short tender" at the lower price, the difference constituting their profit.
Individual investors were at a disadvantage when competing against such practices; further-
more, there was a potential for havoc if the short tender could not be covered. See Henry,
Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers. 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466, 467 (1971); Movlan,
Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions of the Federal Securities Law, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
551, 556 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Exploring the Tender Offer].
19. Corporate officials had less opportunity to resist a tender offer than a merger or a sale of
assets in which the proposal was debated at a meeting and subject to shareholder approval.
Aequisition by tender offer obviated the burden of providing comprehensive advance disclosure
under SEC proxy rules, and was also less vulnerable to judicial scrutiny. See Fleischer &
Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967).
20. Prior to 1968, shareholder relief was limited to actions under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78J(b) (1976), and SEC Rule lob-5. See Sowards & Mofsky,
Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities Legislation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 499
(1967).
21. Conventional wisdom had it that the tender offer was a means of assuring survival of the
fittest by dislodging entrenched but inefficient management. See D. AusTIN & J. FISIIMAN, supra
note 17, at 179-80; Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGEns L. REV. 609,
632-34 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Brudney]. Under this theory, the offer came whenever stock
prices were below book value or attractive in terms of price/earnings ratio. The cause for low
prices was assumed to be poor management, the ouster of which would be a boon to the
corporation and shareholders alike. See Exploring the Tender Offer, supra note 18, at 558.
However, more recent experience suggests that the contrary may be true, i.e., offers are
frequently aimed at well-run companies and their management. See Liman, Has the Tender
Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L. Sci. L. REV. 687, 707-08 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Liman]; Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western,
53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 872, 874 n.9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as State Takeover Statutes]. Ironically,
the theoretical utility of a tender offer may be thwarted when shareholders act in their own best
interests. See Exploring the Tender Offer, supra note 18, at 558.
22. See I11 CoNe. REC. 28256-60 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 113 CONe. REC. 857-58
(1967) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
23. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp.. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Feit v. Leased Data
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Additional factors could attract a
tender offer, such as the target company's lower earnings compared to competitors', surplus
liquid assets and undervalued fixed assets, concentrated institutional share ownership, and
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tional means was likely to be opposed, the tender offer was a safe 24 and
quick25 alternative to obtaining control. Moreover, a tender offer added the
luxury of complete secrecy until the offer was made, and even then the
offeror was not required to disclose his identity, source of funds, future
plans, or equity in the target company. On the other hand, incumbent
management was nearly helpless to resist a takeover despite extreme mea-
sures to perpetuate its tenure. 21
Once the tender offer was made individual shareholders faced pressure to
tender their shares as soon as possible. A shareholder who vacillated might
find that the opportunity to sell his shares had passed. Conversely, if he
tendered immediately he would be unable to accept a better offer later. 27 For
shareholders left holding some or all of their shares after an offer expired,
there was a good chance that little would remain of the company. The
resulting uncertainty was further aggravated by a lack of information on
which to base a decision.
When federal regulation of cash tender offers was first proposed in 1965,28
its purpose ostensibly was to protect incumbent management from the on-
nominal management holdings. M KATZ & R. LOEB, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS STRATEGY AND
TACTICS 178 (1979). Liquidation of the target company was said to be common practice when
the offeror financed the bid using the assets of the target company as security. See 111 CoNG.
REC. 28258 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 113 CONC. REC. 855 (1967) (remarks of Sen.
Williams). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINIIORN, supra note 17, at 1-9.
24. Unlike the shareholders who surrendered control of their shares upon tendering, the
bidder might, for example, protect himself with an escape clause in case a law suit arose in
connection with the offer. See Exploring the Tender Offer, supra note 18, at 555. Furthermore,
the bidder was free, according to the terms of the offer, to withdraw at any time before the
stated number of shares were tendered. Id.
25. Furthermore, there was no time limit on how long an offer was to remain open. This
feature was scarcely affected by the Williams Act, since the Act merely required that the offer be
kept open for a least seven days. See note 37 infra. Thus, for an offer that was registered late
Friday afternoon, the published announcement would not appear until Monday morning and
the target would have only four days in which to respond.
26. A wide spectrum of techniques were available to thwart an unwanted takeover. Their
effectiveness, however, depended primarily on advance planning because once the tender offer
commenced it was generally too late. See generally A. FLEISCHER, JR., TENDEn OFFES: DEFENSES,
RESPONSES, AND PLANNING (1978). Some techniques that were used, however, also raised ques-
tions of fiduciary duty involving the true motivation for corporate actions which were less for the
benefit of shareholders than to keep management in office. The problem persists under the
Williams Act. See Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Dejensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979). The success rate for hostile tender offers before the Williams Act
was nevertheless very high, about 4 out of 5. For a detailed sampling of more recent success
rates, see State Takeover Statutes, supra note 21, at 872 n.2.
27. The bidder was under no obligation to purchase more than the minimum number of
shares stated in the offer. Once the offer was fully subscribed there was no real market for the
remaining shares. Moreover, arbitrageurs were in a position to respond more quickly to an offer,
thereby increasing the risk to the ordinary investor. A common defensive technique for manage-
ment was to find a "white knight", i.e., a friendly offeror, to make a bettei offer. Shareholders
who had already deposited their shares were precluded from accepting the better offer.
28. The original bill, S. 2731, was introduced by Senator Williams on October 22, 1965. S.
2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REC. 28256 (1965).
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slaughts of "corporate raiders. ' 29 The bill provided for twenty days advance
notice to both the target company and the SEC if the intended offer would
have resulted in ownership by the offeror of five percent or more of the target
company's outstanding shares.3 0 Although the original bill was never passed,
many of its provisions formed the basis for the second bill, which was
introduced in 1967. 31 During the interim, however, solicitude for manage-
ment's interests gradually yielded to a greater awareness of the needs of
shareholders. In addition, the use of tender offers ceased to be viewed as
wrong per se.3 2 As a consequence, the second bill manifested less concern
with preventing takeovers than with protecting investors. The bill, which
became known as the Williams Act, was finally enacted in the form of two
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 33
The principal aim of the Williams Act is to benefit the interests of share-
holders without unduly impeding legitimate takeover bids.3 4 To achieve this
result, it is required that information material to an investor's decision be
disclosed concurrently with the making of a tender offer.35 This approach
29. 111 CONG. REC. 28257 (1965). One writer dubbed the original bill "The Incumbent
Management Protection Act" as more accurately reflecting the interests that were to be pro-
tected. Exploring the Tender Offer, supra note 18, at 553.
30. 111 CONG. REc. at 28259 (1965). The fact that the bill was not passed with this provision
has been construed by some, including the MITE court, 633 F.2d at 497 n.23, as conclusive
evidence that the purpose of the original bill conflicted with that congressional purpose em-
bodied in the Williams Act, as passed. Cf. State Regulation, supra note 6, at 688. Under this
reasoning the numerous state takeover acts that incorporate such pre-offer notice provisions
would be preempted. However, the fact that Congress rejected provisions similar to those found
in state takeover acts does not mean the state laws are automatically preempted. See, e.g., De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). Moreover, an attempt to impart significance to the
difference in the approaches taken by the two bills would be a "hazardous matter" if the purpose
for doing so was to strike down legislation. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84
(1968). See note 151 infra.
31. The second bill, S. 510, was introduced by Senators Williams and Kuchel on January 18,
1967. S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 841 (1967).
32. See State Regulation, supra note 6, at 688. Ironically, official opinion appears to be
coming around full circle. Unsettled by the legitimacy hostile tender offers have come to enjoy,
Chairman Harold Williams of the SEC bemoaned current treatment of corporations as nothing
more than the sum of their properties. Fe complained that increasing recourse to acquisitions
and takeovers to achieve corporate expansion had hurt the United States economically. Con-
glomerate Mergers-Their Effects on Small Business and Local Communities, 1980: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Activities Affecting Small Business of
the House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 255, 287-88 (testimony of Harold M.
Williams, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
33. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976) (amended 1970)).
34. 113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35
(1977) (sole purpose of Williams Act was investor protection).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). The tender offer made in MITE was governed by the
disclosure requirements set forth in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1979). If the tender offer would
result in ownership by the bidder of five percent or more of the class of the target company's
securities for which the offer was made, the bidder had to file Schedule 14D-1, which included:
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differs from the pre-offer notice requirement called for in the original bill.3 6
The Act also provides that tendered shares may be withdrawn any time up to
seven days after the offer, 37 or after sixty days if the shares have not been
taken up. 8 If the shares tendered within ten days exceed the number stated
in the offer, all shares offered must be taken up pro rata. 39 Additionally, the
Act requires that any increase in the price for shares while the offer is still
open applies to shares that have already been deposited. 40 Finally, the Act
generally prohibits false statements or omissions of any material fact, as well
as fraudulent or manipulative practices in connection with tender offers. 41
The advent of the Williams Act produced fears that the tender offer would
cease to be an effective takeover device. 42 Those fears proved groundless, but
critics of the Act suggested that the federal regulation fell short of its goal of
investor protection. 431 The primary objection was that shareholders and man-
agement had insufficient time to evaluate a hostile tender offer. Responding
to pressure for stricter control, 44 state legislatures enacted their own tender
(1) the hidder's name, (2) the exact dates that the shareholders' rights of withdrawal began and
ended, and (3) the date that the proration period expired if the offer was for less than all the
outstanding shares of a class.
36. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
37. The SEC later extended the initial withdrawal period to 15 business days. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-7(a)(l) (1980). However, the seven-day period was still in effect during MITE's tender
offer.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976). This provision prevents the bidder from tying up shares
indefinitely, thereby easing some of the shareholders' risks in tendering. See note 27 and accom-
panying text supra. See also SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF
COlu'ORA'rE EQUITY OWNERSIIIP IN COIU'ORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1967)[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 550].
39. Shares were taken up according to the number deposited by each shareholder. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(6) (1976). The same pro rata acceptance rule applies to shares tendered within 10 days
of an increase in the purchase price offered. Id. The provision alleviates the fear that later shares
tendered in excess of the amount stated in the offer will be rejected.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976). Thus, all shareholders were assured equal treatment
regardless of the time at which the shares were tendered. See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 38, at
10.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
42. See Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomoi. On Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 138-39, 165-75 (1967) (statements of Robert 11.
MUndheim and Stanley Foster Reed). See also Brudney, supra note 21, at 623-25; Manne, Cash
Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 2:31.
43. See, e.g., Arsht, The Delaware Takeover Statute- Special Problems Jor Directors, 32
Bus. LAW. 1461, 1461 (1977).
44. The impetus for many state takeover acts came from local corporations and their chief
executive officers. See E. AIHANOW & H. EINIIOIRN, supra note 17, at 151-52 rn.3, 4 (origins of the
Ohio act; Pennsylvania and Illinois acts also discussed); Bartell, The Wisconsin Takeover Stat-
ute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1465, 1466 (1977) (origins of the Wisconsin act); Wilner & Landy, The
Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORIIAM L. REV. 1, 18
n. 104 (1976) (origin of the Ohio and Idaho acts) [hereinafter cited as Wilner & Landy]; State
Regulation, supra note 6, at 689 n.16 (Illinois and Pennsylvania originally resisted pressure to
enact takeover act) and 690-91 (origins of the Ohio act).
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offer regulations.15 These regulations were sometimes justified by the recog-
nized state interest in the internal affairs of its corporations. State statutes
generally adopted Congress' intent to provide investor protection, 46 but in
some respects they diverged from the specific approach taken in the Williams
Act. Delay was one difference between the state and federal approach that
was common to all state statutes. The states generally imposed a waiting
period before a contemplated tender offer was allowed to proceed; however,
the potential for delay varied. Some statutes required nothing more than
official clearance of the disclosure statement. 47 Others interposed a specific
waiting period, typically twenty days, while also requiring disclosure and
45. See VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1978), which became effective four months before the
Williams Act. Since then 36 other state statutes have been enacted. ALASKA SrAT. §§ 45.57.010-
.120 (1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -1264.14 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to
-108 (Cum. Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 36-456 to -468 (1979 & Supp. 1982): DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp. 1980); §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977); HAWAI REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1
to -15 (1976); IDAHO CooD: §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1982): ILL. REV. STAr. ch.
1212, §§ 137.51 to 137.70 (1981); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-3.1-1 to -11 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1982); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 502.102, .211 -. 215 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to
-1284 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 292.560-991 (Cum. Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51:1500-:1512 (West Supp. 1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 11OC, §§ 1-13 (West Supp.
1982); MiCii. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901-917 (Cum. Supp. 1981-82): MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 409.500-.565 (Vernon 1979); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376-.3778 (1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§
421A:1 to :15 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to :19 (West Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1614 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (Supp.
1979); OuIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Stpp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1982-83); S.C. CODE §§ 35-2-10 to -110 (Cum. Supp. 1981); S.D. CoMp.
LAWS ANN. 47-32-1 to -47 (Stupp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (1979 & Cum.
Supp. 1981) UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -11 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAr. ANN. §§ 552.01-25
(West Supp. 1981). A complete discussion of the variations among state takeover acts and their
validity tinder the supremacy clause and the commerce clause is beyond the scope of this Note.
For a more detailed analysis see, E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 16;
Langevoort, supra note 7.
46. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 /, § 137.51-1 (1979), which provides:
The purpose of this Act shall be to protect the interests of Illinois security holders of
companies having a close connection with this State without unduly impeding take-
over offers, and this Act shall be interpreted so as to strike a balance that does not
favor either management of the target company or an offeror.
The takeover bid is essentially a matter involving the corporation, its directors, officers, and
stockholders thus, some commentators contend it should be considered an internal affair which
the state may reasonably regulate on a global basis. See, e.g., Shipman, supra note 7, at 741-45.
Takeover acts generally seek to increase the protection afforded to investors. See, e.g., ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 1212, § 137.51-1 (1979). Logically, therefore, the acts should be part of the state
"blue sky" laws regulating local securities transactions, but jurisdiction over the tender offer is
based primarily on minimum contacts of the target company with the state, rather than
involvement with resident investors. See note 52 infra. Because of the extraterritorial reach of the
takeover acts, they are more analogous to state corporation laws than to narrower blue sky laws.
See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 220. Not surprisingly, the states differ in how they categorize
their takeover statutes. Id. at 220 n.43.
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1980); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. § 11-902 (Supp. 1980).
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possibly a hearing. 48 In addition to the disclosure and hearing provisions a
few states required that the offer be "fair" .4 1 Opponents of state statutes
argued that delay worked in favor of incumbent management to frustrate
consummation of the tender offer.50 The asserted pro-management bias of
the state takeover acts spawned criticism that they were enacted more for the
benefit of local companies than for the protection of shareholders.,'
Another problematic feature of state takeover laws was their extraterritor-
ial reach. Jurisdiction was based on a combination of factors establishing a
minimum contact with the state, such as, incorporation within the state,
principal place of business or substantial assets in the state, or a certain
number of resident shareholders..5 2 Thus, for example, a tender offer occur-
ring in one state and affecting shareholders scattered throughout the country
might be subject to the takeover law of another state where a manufacturing
plant of the target company was located. 53 Such an extreme application of
48. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1503 (1975 & Curn. Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW
§ 1604 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82).
49. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/, § 137.57E (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-4a(2)
(West Supp. 1981-82).
50. See P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASIt TENDER OFFERS 14 (1977)
("[T]ime-the more the better-is generally considered critical in successfully fending off tender
offers.") See also Wilner & Landy, supra note 44, at 9-10.
51. See note 44 supra. Some statutes have explicit provisions that demonstrate a parochial
interest. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 292.560 -.630 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (purpose of the act is "the
prevention of take-over bids through the purchase of corporate securities") (emphasis added).
However, other state takeover acts were carefully drafted to remain neutral towards the con-
tenders, while genuinely seeking to protect shareholders. See Berman, The New York Takeover
Statute, 32 Bus. LAW. 1473, 1481 (1977). Nevertheless, incorporation in a state having a
stringent takeover statute was considered a good defensive tactic against potential tender offers.
The states thus benefited from stringent takeover statutes insofar as they preserved local industry
and attracted new industry. State Regulation, supra note 6, at 690. See also, Langevoort, supra
note 7, at 240; Wilner & Landy, supra note 44, at 18; Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon
State Regulation of Tender OfJers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1159 (1974).
52. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/, § 137.52-10 (1979). Jurisdiction is based on the
target company having either 10% of its outstanding shares held by Illinois residents or any two
of the following characteristics: (a) its principal executive office in the state, (b) incorporation
under the laws of the state, (c) at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented
in the state.
53. Jurisdiction in such a case would run counter to the historical preference for the laws of
the charter state to govern the internal affairs of a corporation. Some states, however, have been
permitted to apply local law to internal transactions of "foreign" corporations. See, e.g.,
Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 321-22, 327 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 411, 12
Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (1961). See also Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137
(1955).
The state's interest in regulating the takeover of corporations with a significant presence in the
state is clear; numerous jobs and substantial revenues may be at stake. Furthermore, contacts
with the state of incorporation may be minimal. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186
(1977). Nevertheless, there is a serious danger that multiple and inconsistent laws will be applied
if more than one state attempts to assert jurisdiction. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 502.
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the law could hardly be justified on the basis of shareholder protection5 4 or
state interest in corporate affairs. 55 Some states attempted to avoid the
inconsistency with a comity provision. 56 Nevertheless, serious questions of
federalism were raised that have not been overlooked by commentators
57
nor, more recently, by the courts.
5
Initially, offerors attempted to comply with the applicable state laws, but
in 1978 several state laws came under constitutional attack. 59 The demise of
state takeover acts appeared imminent after the Fifth Circuit held that
Idaho's statute violated the supremacy clause and the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. 60 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
appeals court on procedural grounds leaving the constitutional issues unre-
solved. 6 Nevertheless, it was only a matter of time before another state law
would be struck down. When the events in MITE Corp. v. Dixon began to
unfold, the decisional law and commentary were almost unanimously
against the validity of state takeover laws.
54. See note 46 supra.
55. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
56. See, e.g., ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.53 (1979) (exempts offerors from filing and
requisition requirements if the other jurisdiction has statutes which give substantially equal
protection to shareholders).
57. These questions are the focal point of this Note, and reflect the central concern of most
commentators, cited herein, who have examined the impact of state takeover laws. The weight
of opinion is against the validity of the takeover laws under both the supremacy clause and the
commerce clause. But to some extent the conclusion that the state laws are preempted under the
former relies on the more convincing conclusion that they impermissibly burden interstate
commerce. Examined exclusively under the supremacy clause, it is doubtful that most state
takeover laws would be preempted by the Williams Act. Moreover, their invalidity under the
commerce clause is founded principally on the extraterritorial impact they have. If this were
ameliorated, most constitutional objections would be significantly weakened. See notes 196-201
and accompanying text infra.
58. Initially, courts followed the lead of the majority of commentators in finding that state
takeover laws were unconstitutional under the supremacy clause and the commerce clause. But
the contrary view eventually gained momentum in some jurisdictions. See, e.g, AMCA Int'l
Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979). In AMCA the court determined that the
Williams Act was not so pervasive as to preclude concurrent state regulation and the federal
interest was not so dominant in the field of securities regulation as to preclude state participation
in the same field. Because simultaneous compliance with the Williams Act and the Ohio act was
possible, the latter was not preempted. Moreover, the Ohio act served a legitimate public interest
which was not outweighed by the burden of out-of-pocket costs of compliance, and the Act did
not favor parochial interests to the detriment of other states. Hence, the Ohio Act was constitu-
tional under both the supremacy clause and the commerce clause. See also Strode v. Esmark,
Inc., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,538 (Cir. Ct. Franklin County, Ky. May 13, 1980)
(Kentucky Act upheld under reasoning similar to AMCA), ajf'd, [1981-82] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,238 (Ky. App. Apr. 3, 1981).
59. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
60. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
61. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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THE MITE DECISION
Facts and Procedural History
On January 19, 1979 the MITE Corporation (MITE) 2 offered to pay
$28.00 per share 3 for all outstanding shares of the Chicago Rivet & Machine
Company (Chicago Rivet).64 MITE filed Schedule 14D-1 with the SEC, as
required by federal law.1 5 Instead of complying with concurrent provisions
of the Illinois Business Take-Over Act,"" however, MITE filed suit against
Chicago Rivet and the Illinois Secretary of State6 7 to enjoin enforcement of
the Illinois Act and to have the Act declared null and void on its face because
it violated the supremacy clause and the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution."8
Responding to MITE's action, Chicago Rivet brought suit in a Pennsylva-
nia state COUrt, 1 9 alleging that the tender offer would violate the Pennsylva-
nia Takeover Disclosure Law. 70 Jurisdiction in that action was based on the
fact that Chicago Rivet had both its principal place of business and a
substantial number of its assets in Pennsylvania. A complaint was also filed
with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission seeking to have the Pennsylva-
nia law enforced against MITE. At the same time, Chicago Rivet moved to
dismiss the action commenced in the northern district of Illinois on grounds
that neither of the defendants had any present intention of invoking the
Illinois Act against MITE. The district court, however, denied the motion
and ordered the defendants not be permitted to proceed against MITE under
the Illinois Act without giving at least two business days' prior written
notice.71
MITE subsequently removed the action that Chicago Rivet had initiated
in Pennsylvania to federal court, challenging the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania Act. Soon thereafter, the Pennsylvania Securities Commission
decided not to enforce the Pennsylvania Act against the proposed tender
offer, and the district court in the northern district of Illinois denied Chicago
Rivet's motion to restrain MITE's original suit. 72 As a result, each defendant
62. MITE Corporation and MITE Holdings, Inc. were Delaware corporations with their
principal executive offices in New Haven, Connecticut. 633 F.2d at 488.
63. The price to be offered represented a premium of more than $4.00 per share over the
market price just before the offer was announced. 633 F.2d at 488.
64. The target company was a publicly-held Illinois corporation with its principal executive
offices in Bellwood, Illinois. Of 2,181 shareholders of record, 589 were residents of Illinois who
collectively owned more than 43% of the outstanding common stock.
65. See note 35 supra.
66. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1211/2, §§ 137.51-70 (1979).
67. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79 C 200 (N.D. 111. Feb. 9, 1979). Illinois Secretary of State
Alan J. Dixon and Chicago Rivet & Machine Company were both named defendants in this
action.
68. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
69. 633 F.2d at 488-89.
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1982-83).




notified MITE that they intended to halt the proposed tender offer because it
was violating the Illinois Act. MITE then renewed its request for relief before
the federal district court in Illinois. The district court found the Illinois Act
to be unconstitutional under the supremacy and commerce clauses of the
Constitution and enjoined the Illinois Secretary of State from enforcing the
Act against MITE. 73  The tender offer finally appeared in the national
edition of the Wall Street Journal on February 5, 1979.74
On appeal, the Illinois Secretary of State 7 5 challenged the district court's
decision that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit,
however, unanimously affirmed the lower court's ruling. 76
The Seventh Circuit's Rationale
In determining whether the Illinois Business Take-Over Act was pre-
empted by the Williams Act, the Seventh Circuit noted that Congress had
not expressly chosen to bar the states from regulating tender offers, 77 nor had
Congress instituted a scheme so pervasive as to manifest an implicit intention
to preempt concurrent state legislation. 7 Thus, the court's analysis was
limited solely to whether the Illinois Act stood "as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress. '" 79
The court determined that the dominant purpose embodied in the Williams
Act was investor protection.8 0 Investors were protected through the "market
approach" which contemplated full disclosure by both the offeror and the
incumbent managers of a target company so that the investor could deter-
mine for himself whether to tender his shares pursuant to the offer.,' Mea-
73. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79 C 200 (N.D. I11. Feb. 9, 1979).
74. Although MITE subsequently withdrew its tender offer, it still faced criminal and civil
liability under the Illinois Act for having made the tender offer on February 5, 1979. As a result,
the issues raised on appeal were not moot. 633 F.2d at 490. CJ. Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v.
Connelly, 473 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1979) (challenge to the constitutionality of the Massachu-
setts Act rendered moot by plaintiff's post-trial disclaimer of any further interest in making a
tender offer).
75. Chicago Rivet did not join in the appeal. 633 F.2d at 488.
76. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 491. Under § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1976), state authority to regulate securities was explicitly preserved to the extent it did not
conflict with federal securities legislation. According to the Supreme Court, "[t]he section was
plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state authority." Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979). The MITE court, however, took the position that § 28(a) was
aimed primarily at preserving state blue sky laws. 633 F.2d at 491 n.5.
78. In Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1274-75 (5th Cir. 1978), the court
concluded that the 1934 Act did not preclude state tender offer legislation, but refused to
consider whether the Williams Act amendments to the 1934 Act signalled Congress' intention to
completely occupy the field. The MITE court concluded they did not. Thus, a state takeover
statute could, at least theoretically, be structured so as not to frustrate the congressional objective
of investor protection. 633 F.2d at 493, 502-03.
79. 633 F.2d at 492.
80. Id.
81. The market approach of the Williams Act, described as the function of getting all
relevant information to the investor so that he could decide for himself whether or not to tender,
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sured against this standard, the Illinois statute was found to be at odds with
the federal scheme in several respects.
Most troublesome for the court was the provision granting the Secretary of
State power to deny registration of the takeover offer if, in his opinion, the
offer was unfair.82 This approach empowered the secretary to pass on the
substantive fairness of an offer and to prohibit the offer from going forward
if he found it to be "inequitable" .83 The court objected to this provision, not
because it might slow the progress of tender offers, but because it was
preempted by the conflicting approach of the Williams Act which necessi-
tated that well informed investors be permitted to decide for themselves
whether to tender their shares.14 Insofar as Illinois relied on the judgment of
its Secretary of State rather than the investors' own judgment, its regulatory
scheme was held to be in conflict with federal law. 85
Another provision in the Illinois Act authorized hearings that could be
extended indefinitely.8 In particular circumstances, 87 incumbent manage-
ment might be able to take advantage of this provision to thwart a proposed
tender offer.88 This potential for misuse ran counter to what the court
perceived as "the congressionally-mandated purpose that shareholders be
free within a reasonable time to accept a tender offer they deem fair."8 The
was relied on bv the Fifth Circuit to strike down the Idaho Act. Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978), revd on other grounds sub nor. Leroy v. Great
W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.57E (1979).
83. According to the appellant, review by the secretary was to see if the offer failed to
provide full disclosure of material information or would work a fraud or deceit, but review was
not intended to allow the secretary to evaluate the substantive fairness of the amount offered.
Brief for Appellant at 17, MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Appellant].
84. The court interpreted the Williams Act to require "'unfettered choice by well-informed
investors." 633 F.2d at 494.
85. Id.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121'/2, § 137.57 (1979). A hearing could be requested up to 15
business days after the offeror's registration statement had been filed. The hearing need not be
held until 10 business days after the request was received and the time for the hearing could be
extended for the convenience of the parties. There was no limit on the duration of the hearing,
and after it was concluded the Secretary of State had up to 15 business days to make a
determination unless additional time was needed.
87. Id. § 137.57A permitted a request for a hearing to be made by a majority of the
"independent" directors of the target company or by Illinois residents holding at least 10% of
any class of shares subject to the tender offer. Though incumbent management was not directly
given the right to request a hearing, it could conceivably influence the directors or control a
sufficient number of shares to have one called. 633 F.2d at 494-95.
88. Although the hearing provision could be abused to create excessive delays, the court
failed to acknowledge that some benefits would accrue to shareholders from holding such a
hearing. Thus, the court dismissed appellant's argument that shareholders "will benefit from not
being forced into making a hasty decision [and] Would also benefit from the greater opportunity
for receiving a better offer." Brief for Appellant, supra note 83, at 16. In fact, evidence suggests
that state regulation of tender offers does result in better offers for shareholders, while the use of
tender offers as a takeover device continues unabated. See note 138 infra.
89. 633 F.2d at 494.
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court singled out other delay mechanisms in the Illinois statute that could
obstruct the successful completion of a legitimate tender offer. For example,
the twenty day pre-effective filing requirement90 appeared to tip the regula-
tory balance achieved by the Williams Act toward incumbent management,
thus impairing the vigor of the tender offer device and making it more
difficult for shareholders to tender their shares at a premium. Actual and
potential delay which the Illinois Act created presumably reduced the
chances that a successful tender offer would be made, thereby causing detri-
ment to shareholders. These aspects of the Illinois Act were found to be in
direct opposition to what the court felt was Congress' judgment that delay
grossly beyond that allowed in the Williams Act was in conflict with the
federal scheme for regulating tender offers. 9'
The Seventh Circuit next compared Illinois' interest in regulating tender
offers with the burden imposed by the state takeover act on interstate com-
merce. The asserted state interest was twofold: to protect resident security
holders9 2 and to regulate the internal affairs of Illinois corporations.93 The
court agreed that the first was a legitimate interest, but found that the
protection accorded by the Illinois Act represented only a marginal improve-
ment over the Williams Act, and whatever protection the Illinois Act pro-
vided was offset by the potential for delay under the Act. 94 More impor-
tantly, the Illinois law could be invoked even if none of the affected security
holders were residents of the state. 95 This feature belied the purported state
interest. The second interest was also found to be uncompelling. The Illinois
Act could be applied to foreign corporations and to those with their principal
place of business outside Illinois."" Clearly the state had no interest in regu-
lating the internal affairs of those corporations. 97
In contrast, the impact of the Illinois law on the interstate sale of securities
was significant. The law was global in its reach, and once triggered, all
purchases or offers to purchase stock pursuant to a tender offer could be
stopped, including transactions entirely out of state.99 Furthermore, other
states could claim authority over a tender offer under similar laws, 99 with the
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.54(E) (1979).
91. 633 F.2d at 498.
92. Brief for Appellant, supra note 83, at 121. See note 46 supra.
93. Brief for Appellant, supra note 83, at 121.
94. 633 F.2d at 500.
95. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.52-10 (1979). See note 52 supra. But cf. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 1211/2, § 137.52-9(5) (1979)("an offer ... for which regulation under this Act is not
necessary for the protection of security holders of the target company in this State" may be
exempted by the Secretary of State).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.52-10 (1979). See note 53 supra.
97. 633 F.2d at 502. But see Shipman, supra note 7, at 751-55 (sound reasons exist for a state
to assert jurisdiction over foreign corporations with a substantial presence within the state).
98. The tender offer in MITE represented a proposed transaction in interstate commerce of
more than $23,000,000, affecting shareholders of Chicago Rivet residing throughout the United
States. 633 F.2d at 502.
99. The defendants' attempt to invoke the Pennsylvania act to stop the tender offer in Illinois
illustrates how more than one state's laws might apply. Id. at 489.
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result that "any single state would have effective veto power over the offer
even if it received the enthusiastic endorsement of all the other states."' 00
Because the Illinois Act substantially obstructed interstate commerce without
countervailing local benefit, it was found to violate the commerce clause. ' 0'
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
Underlying the dual challenge to the Illinois Act was the larger issue
concerning the extent of state and federal power to concurrently regulate
securities and corporate transactions. Although the court was careful to point
out that not all state tender offer legislation was barred by the Williams
Act, 102 its treatment of the Illinois statute left serious doubt that any other
could stand. Such harsh scrutiny was not entirely warranted. Control over
the creation and internal management of corporations traditionally has been
a prerogative of the states, 03 and in the field of securities regulation, federal
intrusion has not precluded parallel state legislation.' Given this back-
ground, a state takeover act differing from the specific approach adopted in
the Williams Act should not necessarily be declared null and void. If the
objectives that federal and state statutes seek to attain are essentially the
same, 10 5 legitimate state goals should yield only in the face of a clearly
predominant federal interest. 0 6 The interests identified by the Seventh Cir-
100. Id. at 502.
101. Id.
102. 633 F.2d at 502-03.
103. The power to create corporations is one of the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the
states. People v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 129 N.Y. 474, 482, 29 N.E. 959 (1892). Although
the federal government has, from its inception, had this power, see, e.g., McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the states traditionally have been the source of corporate
charters since revolutionary times. See 4 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN TIll EARLIErI HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPOiHATIONS 24 (1917). Recently, however, there has been a renewed interest in the movement
for more federal regulation of the internal affairs of large multi-state corporations. See Young,
Federal Corporate Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, in CORPORArIONS AT TIlE CROSS-
ROADS: GOVERNANCE ANn REFOIRM 237, 242-44 (D. DeMott ed. 1980). See also the proposed
Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CoNG. REC. 2490 (daily
ed. April 2, 1980).
104. State blue sky laws regulating securities were upheld by the Supreme Court as valid
exercises of police power well before federal entry into the field. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co.,
242 U.S. 539 (1917)(Ohio blue sky law); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559
(South Dakota blue sky law); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (Michigan blue sky
law). Moreover, when Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a) included a
saving clause aimed specifically at preserving state blue sky laws. See note 124 injra.
105. Cf. New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973) ("Where
coordinate state and federal efforts exist within a complimentary administrative framework, and
in the pursuit of common purposes, the case for federal pre-emption becomes a less persuasive
one.")
106. The states clearly will be precluded from legislating over matters which are necessarily
national in import, Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553-54 (1973), or which are governed
by a federal regulatory scheme so pervasive as to leave no room for concurrent state legislation.
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973). The limits of federal
interests are not always defined clearly, however, and when they collide with strong local
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cuit, however, were not so clear as to warrant a wholesale invalidation of the
Illinois Act. In MITE the state law was forced to yield to an unnecessarily
broad interpretation of the Williams Act, as well as a restrictive view of the
states' role in regulating securities transactions and corporate affairs. 07 In-
deed, the reasons advanced in MITE did not support entirely the court's
conclusion, and consequently, the decision provides a poor standard for
assessing the validity of other state takeover statutes.' 08
The Preemption Challenge
As long as Congress acts within the scope of authority delegated to it, that
act is supreme, and state laws which are inconsistent with a congressional
enactment cannot stand.' The clearest case for preemption exists when
Congress expressly reserves to itself, or takes from the states, the power to
regulate within a particular field."l0 In that event there is no room for state
action, regardless of whether the state law comports with federal policy.
Even without specific expressions of congressional intent to preempt, federal
regulation in a particular area may be so pervasive, or the federal interest so
dominant, as to leave no possibility for concurrent state legislation."' An-
interests, the courts are left with the delicate task of allocating power between the two. In such
instances the preemption doctrine is a potent tool for shaping the contours of federalism, but its
use must be guided by an understanding of "the sensitive interrelationship between statutes
adopted by the separate, yet coordinate, federal and state sovereignties." Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973). Cf. Comment, The Impact of Preemption
on Federal-State Cooperation, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 656, 656-57.
107. The court found no reason to believe that Illinois had any special purpose for regulating
the change of control contemplated in the bid for shares of Chicago Rivet, an Illinois corpora-
tion. 633 F.2d at 501. Yet the analogous authority of states to regulate ordinary mergers and the
sales of substantial corporate assets is well established. See notes 198-99 and accompanying text
infra.
108. The reasoning in MITE has already been followed in subsequent challenges to local
takeover statutes. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187-90 (3d Cir. 1980) (New
Jersey Act); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [1981-82] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
j 98,246, at 91, 620-22 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981) (Oklahoma act).
109. The preeminence of federal law over conflicting state law is a constitutional tenet
embodied in the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824).
110. See Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 350
(1933). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 384-86 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as TRIBE].
111. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (registration of aliens). The less
comprehensive a federal regulatory scheme, however, the less likely it is that a state intrusion
will be preempted. See, e.g., New York State Dept. of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405,
421 (1973) (work incentive programs for welfare recipients); Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1973) (recovery of oil spill cleanup costs).
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other clear ground for preemption exists when state and federal laws are
directly contradictory in their requirements, making compliance with both
impossible. 112
Actual conflict, however, need not be limited solely to cases in which one
law, by its very terms, is irreconcilable with the other. Though a conflict
may not be apparent on its face, a state law may nevertheless be struck down
if it conflicts with the underlying objectives of a congressional enactment." 3
The problem in such a case is one of statutory construction, and whether a
conflict is found to exist will depend on the relative weight assigned to the
perceived goals and effects of each statute. The issue is especially uncertain
with respect to the degree of conflict that will be tolerated. The Supreme
Court has recently indicated that some conflict is permissible providing that
the primary congressional purpose of the federal law is not frustrated." 4
The preemption challenge in MITE was based on an alleged conflict
between the Illinois Business Take-Over Act and the underlying congression-
al purpose embodied in the Williams Act." 5 Thus, the court was required to
construe both laws to determine whether the state law, as applied, frustrated
Congress' purpose in enacting the Williams Act."" At the outset, the court
correctly indentified investor protection as the primary goal of federal tender
offer regulation." 7 Accordingly, it would seem that the "crucial inquiry"
should have been limited to determining whether the Illinois Act differed
from the Williams Act in such a way as to frustrate this clear intent of
Congress."" The court's inquiry, however, gradually strayed from the clear
standard of investor protection.
For example, the Illinois statutory provisions allowing for independent
review of a tender offer " was found to stand in fundamental conflict with
federal law. 20 But the fact that the Secretary of State could rule on the
112. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 625-26 n.2 (1973)
(Court upheld invalidation of Burbank City ordinance limiting aircraft takeoff hours because it
conflicted with the FAA's runway preference order).
113. See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976) (law may be "unconstitutional
because it' stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress' ").
114. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), the
Supreme Court permitted a California statute to stand although it conflicted with a New York
Stock Exchange Rule enacted pursuant to § 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Court
suggested that the Rules possessed preemptive capability only when directly in pursuance of the
1934 Act's policies. Id. at 130-31. Also, in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), the
Court distinguished permissible situations in which conflicts between concurrent federal and
state regulation "may possibly arise," from those in which conflicts "will necessarily" arise. Only
the latter mandated preemption. Id. at 554.
115. 633 F.2d at 493.
116. Id. at 492.
117. Id.
118. The court stated that -'the crucial inquiry is whether the Illinois Act differs from the
Williams Act in such a way that achievement of the congressional objective of investor protection
is frustrated." Id. at 493.
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121/2, § 137.57E (1979).
120. 633 F.2d at 493-94.
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fairness of a tender offer was never shown to be an actual obstacle to the
congressional purpose of investor protection. On the contrary, the court
determined that Illinois offered "investor protection at the expense of inves-
tor autonomy,"12' even though it was never shown that investor "autonomy"
was an express purpose of the Williams Act. This subtle expansion of the
Act's purpose eventually took the court well beyond what Congress reasona-
bly must have intended to achieve when it enacted the tender offer legisla-
tion in 1968. At the same time it improperly restricted the ability of the states
to supplement the broad remedial aims of the federal scheme with state
takeover legislation suited to particular local concerns.
Considering the lack of specific prior regulation in the field, one must
assume that Congress decided to rely primarily on disclosure because it was
the proven and least disruptive means of assuring minimal protection for
investors, not because it was the definitive method for regulating tender
offers. 22 By preserving the saving clause, section 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 23
Congress left the door open for the states to fulfill their traditional laboratory
function 24 of devising supplementary legislation suited to specific local con-
cerns.
121. Id. at 494.
122. In filling a gap that had existed in federal securities legislation prior to 1968, the
Williams Act sought to provide full and fair disclosure that would benefit stockholders without
unduly obstructing legitimate business transactions. 113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of
Sen. Williams). The obvious model for the new tender offer legislation was that of the 1933 and
1934 Acts which had worked well until then. Id. at 855. Thus, like exchange offers under the
1933 Act and proxy solicitation under the 1934 Act, cash tender offers were best regulated on the
premise that "secrecy in this area [was] inconsistent with the disclosure pattern generally
prevailing in the American securities markets." Id.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976), states in part:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or
any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any security or any
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules
and regulations thereunder.
The clause was drafted to preserve pre-existing state blue sky laws, and for that reason, one
commentator has argued that it does not save the later and substantially different state takeover
acts. Langevoort, supra note 7, at 247. However, the wording of § 28(a) plainly does not exclude
prospective state legislation, and Congress in enacting the Williams Act did not expressly bar
state regulation of tender offers. 633 F.2d at 491. Therefore, whether Congress implicitly
accepted the prospect of state entry into the field, § 28(a) creates at least the presumption that
state takeover acts are not preempted. See Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State
Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 519 n.63 (1979).
124. Justice Brandeis once compared the states to laboratories for trying novel social and
economic experiments. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1962) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). State experience with local takeover statutes has proved to be useful for both the
SEC, and the American Law Institute in its treatment of takeovers in the proposed Federal
Securities Code. ALl FED. SEC. CODE §§ 606-607 (Proposed Official Draft 1978). Uncertain about
the adequacy of existing law and policy, a congressional committee began reviewing recommen-
dations from both sources aimed at reforming the Williams Act. SEC. REc. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
542, A-i (Feb. 27, 1980). See McCauliff, Federalism and the Constitutionality of State Takeover
Statutes, 67 VA. L. REv. 295, 309-12 (1981) (suggesting revisions of the Williams Act incorporat-
ing features of state takeover acts) [hereinafter cited as McCauliff].
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Ironically, despite unflagging opposition to state takeover statutes, 25 the
SEC is apparently quite willing to borrow from the collective experience of
the states. 2 Dissatisfied with the vaunted market approach to balancing the
competing interests at stake in a tender offer, the Security and Exchange
Commission has advocated reliance on the judgment of independent direc-
tors to deter "inappropriate" takeovers.' 27 Under another section of the
Williams Act governing "going private" transactions, 2 the Commission has
long sought to impose a substantive fairness standard Cluite similar to the one
that proved fatal to the Illinois Act. 29 Regardless of the interpretive value of
comments made by the SEC during the deliberations on the Williams Act, 3"
the Commission's more recent espousal advocating some form of merit re-
view under the Williams Act lends credence to the argument that the market
approach is neither the only nor the preferred method for regulating tender
offers.
125. The SEC traditionally has been opposed to the proliferation of state tender offer legisla-
tion. As early as 1976 the Commission asked that state takeover acts be explicitlv preempted for
fear that the states Would impose increasing and possibly conflicting requirements on hostile
tender offers. SEC. REC. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 351, A-3, 4 (May 5, 1976). Since then the
Commission has periodically urged preemption through amendments either to the Williams Act
or to § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See, e.g., SEC. REG. & L. Rl.P. (BNA) No.
542, A-2 (Feb. 27, 1980). The SEC finally took the initiative when it promulgated new rules
governing tender offers. See note 14 supra. The Commission saw the rules as effectively doing
away with state takeover acts by making the conflict between local acts and the Williams Act
"direct and substantial." Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 34-16384, [1979-80] FE). Sic. L. REP. (CCH)
82,373, at 82,584 (Feb. 5, 1979).
126. See also McCauliff, supra note 124, at 309-12.
127. Conglomerate Mergers-Their Effects on Small Busines.s and Local Communities: Hear-
ings Before the Subcom nu. on Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Activities Affecting Small Business
of the House Conlin. on Small Business, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 255, 287-88 (1980) (testimony of
Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission).
128. Section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n1(e) (1976), governs
issuer tender offers intended to buy out minority shareholders for the purpose of terminating the
company's status as a public corporation subject to federal securities regulation.
129. In 1975, the SEC proposed two alternative rules under § 13(e) of the 1934 Act. Proposed
Rule 13e-3A, 40 Fed. Reg. 7950 (1975), required that consideration offered constitute fair value.
Proposed Rule 13e-313 went further in that the terms of the transaction, including consideration,
had to be fair, while in addition a valid business purpose for the transaction had to exist. 40 Fed.
Reg. 7952 (1975). Two years later the Commission modified its position when it issued Proposed
Rule 13e-3. 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (1977). Instead of a valid business purpose, the new proposed
rule required fairness to minority shareholders. See Proposed Rule 13e-3(b)(i), (2)(i), (2)(iii)(A)-
(J), 42 Fed. Reg. at 60,101. However, a storm of controversy arose over the proposed rules and
the SEC's dubious authority tinder the 1934 Act to institute merit review over securities transac-
tions. Yielding to pressure, the Commission finally promulgated Rule 13e-3 in its present form.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1981). Though not imposing a fairness standard per se, the rule requires
extensive disclosure which effectively exposes the fairness of a going private transaction. The
remedy for unfairness in such a case, however, especially in light of Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), should be left with the state courts. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnovox,
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). See generally Note, Rule 13e-3 and the Going Private Dilemma: the
SEC's Quest for a Substantive Fairness Doctrine, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 883 (1980).
130. See 633 F.2d at 494 n.14.
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The MITE court went on to criticize the various provisions of the Illinois
Act that could have been used by incumbent management to foster delay.'31
Notwithstanding a lack of evidence regarding the actual effect of the Illinois
provisions on tender offers, ' 2 and uncertainty about the particular effect of
delay on shareholders, 3 3 the court concluded that delays which might have
resulted under the state act necessarily conflicted with specific goals Congress
had sought to achieve. First, delay was deemed to prevent shareholders from
accepting within a reasonable time a tender offer they considered fair.1
3 4
Second, the potential for delay presumably had a chilling effect on the use of
tender offers. 135 As a result, the court concluded that shareholders would be
denied the right to tender their shares at a premium. 136
The effects of delay ascribed to the Illinois Act, however, were equally
attributable to the Williams Act. Compared with the absence of specific
tender offer legislation prior to 1968, the disclosure and procedural require-
ments imposed by Congress had a measurable effect on the subsequent
viability of tender offers. Given the inevitable redistribution of economic
benefits that can accompany a shift in regulatory policy, 13 the Williams Act
may fairly be understood to have been a legislative choice to sacrifice some of
the advantages of an entirely unregulated tender offer market in favor of
increased protection for shareholders of target corporations. In this respect
the Illinois Act was no different than the Williams Act in the type of result it
achieved, only in the degree.
138
131. See provisions set forth in notes 86, 87 & 90 supra.
132. Compare 633 F.2d at 495 (some courts have noted 'the possible inhibition or withdrawal
of tender offers" resulting from state takeover statutes) with id. at 498 ("despite the proliferation
of state takeover statutes, there is no clear indication that those endeavoring to obtain corporate
control have curtailed their use of the tender offer mechanism").
133. It is generally assumed that the added delay inherent in state regulation makes tender
offers less attractive to bidders, thereby causing shareholders to lose the opportunity to sell their
undervalued shares at a good price, and allowing inefficient management to remain in control.
See Langevoort, supra note 7. at 238-39. See also note 21 supra. However, it is often the better
managed companies that attract takeover bids. See McCauliff, supra note 124, at 307; State
Takeover Statutes, supra note 21, at 874 n.9. Furthermore, target companies that have been
successfullv taken over are not necessarily better run afterwards. See Liman, supra note 21, at
707-08. An unpublished study by Goldman, Sachs & Co. of 85 takeover bids between January 1,
1976 and June 8, 1979, revealed that more than 50% of target companies that had successfully
defeated a hostile tender offer had shares with a market price higher than that of the rejected
offer price or had been acquired by another company for more than the original offer. Lipton,
Takeover Bids inn the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 106 (1979).
134. 633 F.2d at 494.
135. Id. at 497.
136. Id. at 496.
137. See generally L. T;unow, TuIE ZERo-SuM SOCIETY (1980) (regulations create economic
benefits for some and impose costs upon others).
138. See Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980). This Article points out that both federal and state
takeover regulations may be seen as benefitting shareholders of firms that are taken over.
Compared to premiums of 32% in cash tender offers before the Williams Act, premiums rose to
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Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit went to great lengths to distinguish the
two enactments. In so doing, the court unjustifiably expanded the purpose of
the Williams Act. According to the court's interpretation, investors were
granted much more than mere protection. The MITE court also reasoned
that shareholders have the right to an unfettered choice and the right to
accept an offer within a reasonable time.13 This rationale can be reconciled
with the purposes of a disclosure statute such as the Williams Act. However,
the court's statement that shareholders have a right to make a profit on the
sale of their shares 140 was unwarranted and led to the further conclusion that
"investor protection" was inextricably dependent on the right of offerors to
make successful tender offers.' 4' This line of reasoning disregards the earlier
notion that the Williams Act be neutral towards offerors or incumbent
management. 141 If, as the court implied, tender offers were meant to succeed
for the benefit of shareholders, it logically follows that management cannot
be permitted to resist takeover attempts that offer shareholders an opportu-
nity to sell at a profit.
The Seventh Circuit's liberal view of investor protection under the Wil-
liams Act virtually assured the demise of the Illinois Act. A close examination
of the court's position, however, indicates that a conclusion of conflict be-
tween state and federal goals in regulating tender offers rested on insubstan-
tial grounds.
The proliferation of "rights" resulting from the court's construction of the
Williams Act cannot be said to derive unambiguously from Congress' pri-
mary purpose of investor protection. Because several propositions espoused
by the court were subject to a contrary interpretation, 43 and were arguably
nearly 53% after its enactment. Subsequent passage of state takeover laws caused premiums to
rise to 73 %. In purely economic terms, federal and state tender offer regulations have achieved
their objective of "protecting" target shareholders. The authors, however, found that this
protection was achieved at a social cost borne especially by those investors who were worse off
because of higher premiums. Increased regulation deterred bidding for marginally attractive
targets. Id. at 404. Thus, while the central aim of the Williams Act was advanced by state
legislation, the validity of that aim may be questioned. See notes 226-27 and accompanying text
inJra.
139. 633 F.2d at 494.
140. Id. at 496.
141. Id.
142. See S. REp. No. 550, supra note 38 at 3.
143. For example, the court reasoned that delay impermissibly increased incumbent manage-
ment's ability to defeat a tender offer, thereby harming investors. But the court also admitted
that the contrary proposition found support in legal literature and in the Supreme Court's
decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). 633 F.2d at 495-96. The court
went on to criticize the delay caused by the Illinois Act concluding that it had a chilling effect on
the use of tender offers. While acknowledging that shareholders might actually benefit from
delay, and that the use of tender offers had not visibly been curtailed, the court preferred to rely
on its understanding that Congress had prohibited delay beyond that contemplated under the
Williams Act. Id. at 497-98. The harsh light in which the Illinois Act was cast, even when
favorable interpretations were equally plausible, robbed the court of the detachment and
objectivity essential to its preemption analysis. It ignored the Supreme Court's admonition which
enjoined "seeking out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exists."
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960).
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contradicted by specific language of a Supreme Court decision, 44 it cannot
be safely asserted that Congress specifically intended investor protection to
take on such dimensions. Furthermore, the "rights" uncovered by the court
had no explicit basis in the statutory language of the Williams Act. Such
rights probably would not support an independent cause of action for an
aggrieved shareholder, 145 much less a frustrated offeror. 146 By the same
token, they could not form the basis of a preemptive conflict sufficiently
clear to justify invalidation of the Illinois statute.
It is true that the nature of the preemption challenge in MITE required
that the court construe both the state and federal statutes. 147 But the court
did not have unrestrained liberty to adopt whatever interpretations were
most convenient. 48 Unlike an actual conflict based on the impossibility of
simultaneous compliance, 149 a conflict based on the frustration of underlying
congressional objectives is more elusive, and thus, more susceptible to subjec-
tive interpretation. 150 Because of that danger, the court was under an obliga-
tion to exercise particular care and to eschew guesswork and ambiguous
evidence. 151
144. The Supreme Court clearly stated that "the sole purpose of the Williams Act was the
protection of investors." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977).
145. It is doubtful that private action alleging the failure of a shareholder to make a profit
pursuant to a tender offer could be implied from the Williams Act. Cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (private cause of action should not be implied where
unnecessary to advance primary, rather than subsidiary congressional purposes).
146. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), the Supreme Court refused to
create a private right of action for damages under the Williams Act. "[Congress*] express policy
of neutrality scarcely suggests an intent to confer highly important, new rights upon the class of
participants [offerors] whose activities prompted the legislation in the first instance." Id. at 30.
Cf. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 413, 425 (1975) (no implied
private action under Securities Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-111 (1976)).
147. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
148. When analyzing the preemption issue, the Supreme Court pointed out that where
Congress legislates "in a field which the States have traditionally occupied ...we start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be [ousted] by the Federal Act
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
149. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
150. The difficulties inherent in ascertaining congressional motives and their relevance to
legislative purpose have been explored principally in the areas of equal protection and first
amendment rights. See Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 106 n.321 (1977). See generally A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANc.Elous BRAN H 209-10 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). The principal lesson to be gleaned from instances
where congressional motive has been the determinative factor in preemption analysis is that the
inquiry should be engaged in cautiously and only when necessary.
151. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). The O'Brien Court stated:
Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When
the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements
by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to
sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility
of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked
to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the
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The MITE court, however, followed a different course. Disregarding the
expressed purpose of the Illinois Act, the court examined a number of provi-
sions that exhibited a potential for conflict. The conclusion of preemption
was premised not on an evaluation of the state law as it was applied, but on
the possibility of its abuse. 5 2 For example, the conclusion that the Illinois Act
greatly contributed to delay in making a tender offer was unsupported by the
record. Delay in MITE was precipitated by the offeror's voluntary decision
not to comply with state statutory provisions. 13 In contrast, the court was
extremely liberal in construing the purpose of the Williams Act. Discarding
the clearly articulated standard of investor protection, which was identified
by the Supreme Court as the sole objective of the Act, 54 the court instead
undertook a meticulous search through the Act's legislative history to un-
cover congressional "goals" that conflicted with the Illinois Act. 5 5 In so
doing, the court equated mere characteristics of the Williams Act with its
purpose, 55 though only conflict with the Act's purposes could be properly
used as the basis for preemption.
More importantly, the Seventh Circuit's narrow scrutiny failed to place
the Williams Act within the larger scheme of federal securities legislation.
Without this perspective, remarks made during the give-and-take of the
legislative process could take on exaggerated significance. Rather than insti-
tute a comprehensive plan for regulating tender offers, Congress merely
intended to fill a gap in existing legislation.157 The Williams Act was meant
to be of the same cloth as the entire fabric of federal securities laws.5 8 As
basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates
one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates
scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork.
152. But c. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 554-55 (1973). The Court in Goldstein was
careful to distinguish those situations in which the concurrent exercise of power by the federal
government and the states may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations where conflicts will
oecessarily arise. " It is not . . . a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers,
but an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a
pre-existing right of [state] sovereignty.'" Id. (citing The Federalist No. 32, p. 243 (B. Wright
ed. 1961)). See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960)
(Supreme Court refused to seek out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none
clearly existed).
153. 633 F.2d at 497-98. See notes 174-75 and accompanying text infra.
154. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35 (1977), and note 146 supra.
155. For example, the court compared ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 127.57A (1979), which
potentially afforded incumbent management an opportunity to instigate hearings that would
delay the tender offer, against "the congressional goal of insuring freedom of action of informed
stockholders," which is one or two steps removed from the acknowledged goal of investor
protection. 633 F.2d at 494-95.
156. In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977), the Supreme Court distin-
guished Congress' policy of neutrality in contests for control as merely a characteristic of the
Williams Act rather than its purpose-the protection of investors (emphasis added).
157. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("This legislation will close a
significant gap in investor protection under the Federal securities laws .... )
158. See Shipman, supra, note 7, at 759-60. The author argued that if the Williams Act
represented an integrated national policy, the legislature would have weighed more carefully all
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such, the Act simply made cash tender offers subject to the same type of
disclosure and procedural requirements as had previously existed in other
areas.
Viewed in this light, the conclusion that the Williams Act conferred
important new rights on shareholders is untenable. For instance, it would be
anomalous to suggest that the type of consideration used in a takeover should
affect the rights of the parties involved. Nevertheless, that is the result under
the MITE court's interpretation. A tender offer wholly or partially paid for
with non-exempt securities remains subject, under the Securities Act of 1933,
to the same waiting period that was proscribed under the Illinois Act.'
59
Furthermore, in a tender offer subject to the 1933 Act, the SEC may call for
a hearing or issue a stop order if at any time it appears that the mandatory
registration statement is false or misleading.'60 It seems unlikely that Con-
gress intended to leave one form of tender offer subject to delay and govern-
mental review, while exempting previously unregulated cash tender offers
from such strictures.
A better view would have recognized that the Williams Act merely in-
tended to bring cash tender offers within the established purview of federal
securities laws. These laws have traditionally emphasized disclosure as the
most effective means of protecting the investing public,' 6' while permitting
state legislation to supplement federal law with more stringent, consistent
provisions suited to local concerns.' 6 2 Thus, the disclosure approach to pro-
the political and economic ramifications. However, Congress delegated to the SEC and to the
courts the work of defining the scope of tender offer regulation. Id.
159. Under legislation existing prior to the Williams Act, exchange offers (securities issued in
exchange for securities) had to be registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77bbb (1976). According to § 77h(a), registration of securities did not become effective
until 20 days after it was filed. Id. at § 77h(a). Compare § 77h(a) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2,
§ 137.54E (1979) (takeover offer does not commence until 20 business days after the date of filing
the registration statement) with MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 495 ("the [Illinois] Act's 20-
day pre-effective filing requirement, [is] also subject to more general attack on the ground that
[it] may result in unacceptable delay"). See also §7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §18A (1976).
This section imposes notification and waiting period requirements on large firms contemplating
mergers or acquisitions.
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(dI-(e (1976)
161. The fundamental purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was "'to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emiptor." Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963)).
162. Since Congress entered the field in 1933, the major acts regulating securities have
contained provisions reserving the jurisdiction of state securities commissions. E.g., Securities
Act of 1933, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1976); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 79u (1976);
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, § 326, 15 U.S.C. § 77zzz (1976); Investment Company Act of 1940,
§ 50, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-49 (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, § 222, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-18a
(1976). In addition, § 16 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1976), § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976), and 323(b) of the 1939 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77WWW(b) (1976), also
preserve rights and remedies that exist at law or in equity. Several other provisions preserve local
control whenever feasible. See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 591-605 (1961); II id. at 797-
98, 1299-1300, 1401. Perhaps because there were so few state statutes regulating investment
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tecting investors under the Williams Act can accommodate reasonable delay
and independent review of tender offers, as found in the Illinios Act. There-
fore, the state statute is not preempted so long as it seeks to augment the
degree of investor protection in a takeover situation and is consistent with the
approach taken in other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Nevertheless, the
conclusion that the Illinois Act is not preempted by the expressed or underly-
ing objectives of the Williams Act does not foreclose the possibility that the
state law raises a significant barrier to the broader interests of unimpeded
interstate commerce.
The Commerce Clause Challenge
Unlike the narrow compass of the preemption doctrine, the commerce
clause 163 embraces a wide range of activities including matters beyond those
specifically addressed by Congress. 16 4 Through its negative implications, the
commerce clause assures that less explicit objectives of national policy will
not be hampered by parochial state legislation. Thus, despite a lack of
conflict with the particular purpose of the Williams Act, the Illinois statute
might nevertheless encroach upon the national interest in the free flow of
commerce.16 5 Nonetheless, Illinois is not wholly without power to pursue
valid local interests, even when the exercise of that power affects interstate
advisers in 1940, the Investment Advisers Act had no saving clause when originally enacted.
Twenty years later Congress amended the act to clearly express the states' concurrent jurisdiction
in this area, "in view of the important role which State authorities must play in the supervision of
securities.' S. REPI. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960), reprinted in [1960] U.S. ConE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3502, 3511. One explanation for Congress' grant of concurrent jurisdiction in the
field of securities regulation is that the federal scheme essentially adopted a disclosure approach,
whereas existing state bhlue sky laws employed more substantive, "merit" standards. See, e.g.,
11C 1-1. SOWARDS & N. Hscu, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONs-BLuE SKY REGULATION § 1.01, at 1-4
(1981).
163. The power to regulate commerce was expressly delegated to Congress by the Constitu-
tion. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
164. While Congress has near plenary power to regulate commerce among the states, the
Constitution does not say what the states may or may not do absent congressional action. H.P.
Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1949). Even if Congress does not legislate in a
particular area, the states may nevertheless be constrained in the exercise of their own power.
When danger emanates from interstate commerce a state may protect its citizens' health and
safety, and from exposure to fraud, however, the unique interdependence of the states requires
that they abstain from burdening or constricting the flow for their own economic advantage and
to the detriment of other states. Id. at 533.
165. The precise limits of state power have been hard to define. For more than 150 years the
Supreme Court has struggled to elaborate an accurate test for discerning the extent to which
states may control interstate commerce. According to Justice Marshall, the commerce power was
exclusively federal, though the states could, in the pursuit of other legitimate goals, take action
which affected commerce to some extent. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 208 (1824).
Later courts have applied less restrictive standards. For example, in Cooley v. Board of War-
dens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1852), Pennsylvania was allowed to regulate matters primarily of
local rather than national concern. The relevant standard has also been cast in terms of direct
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commerce, or to some extent, regulates it. " ' The ultimate question when
competing interests are at stake is whether the constraints imposed by the
Illinois law on interstate commerce are too burdensome to be permitted.
In MITE the commerce clause analysis was limited to balancing the
putative interests of the state in regulating tender offers against the burden
imposed by those regulations on interstate commerce. 7 Insofar as the court
did not assess the arguably protectionist nature of the Illinois statute 16 8 the
court overlooked the most formidable grounds for striking down the law.6 9
Although the court did not find the law to be discriminatory, it also did not
establish whether a legitimate local purpose existed. 70 It may have been that
versus indirect, Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), or discriminatory versus nondiscriminatory impact
on interstate commerce. Compare Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (state
regulation prohibiting importation of waste materials held to have a discriminatory impact on
interstate commerce) with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (state
regulation of containers in which milk could be sold held not to have a discriminatory impact on
interstate commerce). Professor Tribe has suggested that an underlying consideration has often
been whether state action imposes distinct burdens on out-of-state interests that are not repre-
sented in the state's political process. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 326-27. Today, local regulation
will probably be upheld if it rationally relates to a legitimate state end, and the state interest
involved outweighs the burden on interstate commerce and any discrimination against it. Id. at
326. See note 167 infra.
166. Compare South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1938)
(state's interest in promulgating safety regulations justified the burden on interstate commerce)
with Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (state's interest in promulgating
safety regulations outweighed by need to maintain federal uniformity).
167. 633 F.2d at 500. The MITE court patterned its commerce clause analysis after Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). According to Pike, a state statute would be upheld if it
regulated evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and interstate commerce
was only incidentally affected. If the burden on such commerce clearly exceeded the putative
local benefits, or the same benefits could be achieved by other means having less impact on
interstate activities, the state statute would be struck down. Id. at 142.
168. MITE Corporation did not argue that the Illinois Act was so economically protectionist
as to be illegal per se. 633 F.2d at 502 n.31. Cf. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1034
(4th Cir. 1980) (Fourth Circuit refused to base preemption on assumption that Virginia act
favored local management). State takeover statutes were sometimes enacted as a result of
pressure from local concerns, see note '14 supra, and some actually expressed an undeniably
protectionist bent. See note 51 supra.
169. For the late Justice Black, the only restriction on the states' power to regulate interstate
commerce, absent congressional legislation, was that they refrain from patently discriminating
against interstate commerce in favor of local trade. P. BENSON, TIlE SUPREME COURT AND TIlE
COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970 at 246-49 (1970). Although restrictions do exist, the Supreme
Court has been intolerant of economically discriminatory state legislation. See City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1977); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). At
least one state court had adopted a similar position. E.g., Unitrode Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 379 Mass. 487, 399 N.E.2d 5 (1980) (the court found that the Massachusetts act's
departure from neutrality, said to be indicative of an "anti-takeover philosophy" in state legisla-
tion, constituted a principal ground for invalidating the act.)
170. Though the Seventh Circuit recognized Illinois' interest in protecting resident sharehold-
ers, the legitimacy of that interest was apparently undermined by the state's potential control
over tender offers that did not involve any Illinois residents. 633 F.2d at 500-01. Elsewhere the
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by examining the nature and extent of Illinois' interests the court tacitly
accepted that the purpose of the law was valid. Moreover, a presumption of
validity is in accordance with Congress' explicit consent to nonconflicting
state securities laws under section 28(a) of the 1934 Act.' 7' Additionally, the
long standing dual system for regulating securities under state and federal
laws has demonstrated that a cooperative approach to regulation is not only
tolerable, but desirable. 172 Federal interests in this field need not be jealously
guarded providing that concurrent state legislation accords with the predom-
inant interests established by Congress and the Supreme Court.
Assuming, therefore, that the Illinois Act sought a legitimate purpose, the
question then becomes the degree to which the burden on interstate com-
merce will be tolerated. 73 The burden must be measured in terms of the cost
and effects of compliance with the Illinois Act rather than the more burden-
some consequences of noncompliance;1 74 otherwise, the practical impact of
the law will remain indeterminate. In this respect, the MITE court failed to
distinguish the burdens resulting directly as a consequence of the Illinois Act
from those arising out of the offeror's defiance of its provisions. 175 Had MITE
Corporation chosen to comply with the Illinois Act, it would have encoun-
tered only incidental and administrative costs 76 and a waiting period. 177
court contrasted the state's possible interest in regulating transfers of control in domestic corpora-
tions, and tile lack of valid interest in regulating the affairs of foreign corporations. 1d. at 501-02.
Under the analysis in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), the absence of a
legitimate interest would presumably obviate the need to balance local benefits and interstate
burdens. See note 167 supra.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). See note 123 supra.
172. See note 162 supra.
173. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (burden on interstate com-
merce must be balanced against putative local benefits).
174. See State Takeover Statutes, supra note 21, at 923. "[I]f the effects of noncompliance
were typically balanced against the benefits of state regulation, it would be a rare state statute
that survived the commerce clause test."
175. "The same day [that MITE Corporation] filed its Schedule 141-1 with the SEC, [it] also
commenced [an] action ... seeking to have tile Illinois Act declared null and void on its
face .. .- 633 F.2d at 488. When the State attempted enforcement of the Illinois Act, a
prelinlinary injunction was ordered precluding application of tile Act to MITE. Id. at 489. Yet
the court undertook its commerce clause analysis as if the Act had been invoked. Id. at 502.
176. Under the Illinois Act the filing fee was $1,250, $500 more for a hearing, and $250 more
for an interpretive opinion. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121/2, § 137.61 (1979). CJ. AMCA Int'l Corp. v.
Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio 1979). The Ohio act in AMCA Int'l imposed a cost of
$100,000 in personnel and office expenses and $453,000 in loan commitment fees. When these
costs were compared to the contemplated purchase price of $200,000,000 and other costs not
related to the Ohio act, they were not considered overly burdensome. Moreover, delay in AMCA
was equally attributable to the FTC which had not completed its consideration of tile antitrust
implications of the proposed takeover under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18A (1976), when the action was commenced.
177. Although the Seventh Circuit assumed the worst, i.e., that the tender offer would be
extended indefinitely, a commerce clause analysis should be based on the assumption that state
laws will be reasonably carried out, rather than abused, unless evidence indicates the contrary.
Cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). In that case the
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Insofar as the balancing undertaken by the Seventh Circuit emphasized
the "potentially weighty" 7 8 burden that the Illinois Act might have imposed,
it was defective. Too much weight was given to burdens that never arose. In
contrast, the state's presumably legitimate attempt to increase investor pro-
tection was dismissed as too speculative, 7 and the interest in regulating
shifts of control of companies incorporated under Illinois law also was found
to be uncompelling.I8 Although the tender in this case was made for an
Illinois corporation,' 8' the court emphasized that foreign corporations with
their principal place of business outside the state also could be subject to
Illinois' tender offer regulations."8 2 On this basis, the court ruled that the
burdens placed on interstate commerce by the Illinois Act were excessive.
The principal concern in MITE was that the global impact of the Illinois
Act could result in the delay or frustration of a contemplated tender offer.8 3
The court's concern, however, was misplaced. From the point of view of
investors, delay merely extended the time to make an informed decision, and
for offerors, delay would be no more burdensome than that resulting from
statutory mandates requiring shareholders to approve a conventional merger
or sale of assets.' 8 4 To the extent that delay might lessen the chances of a
successful takeover, offerors would be no worse off than in an exchange offer
or a proxy contest. 8 5 Indeed, the similarity between proxy contests and
tender offers for control was substantial enough for Congress to append the
new regulations for third party tender offers to the existing section for proxy
regulation under the 1934 Act.' 8" In addition, both takeover methods allow
"the-offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their
Supreme Court refused to sustain a commerce clause challenge to Detroit's air pollution ordi-
nance, based on the possibility of conflicting requirements, when nothing in the record suggested
the existence of competing or conflicting local regulations. Id. at 448.
178. 633 F.2d at 502.
179. Id. at 500.
180. Id. at 501.
181. See note 64 supra.
182. 633 F.2d at 501-02.
183. Id. at 502.
184. The statutory procedure for consummating a merger or sale of substantial corporate
assets requires among other things that the board of directors approve the plan and submit the
plan to a vote at a shareholders' meeting. The merger or sale can also involve a proxy fight
subject to federal disclosure regulations. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.61, .63-66, .72-.73
(1979). The potential for delay using these traditional methods is at least as long as that imposed
by the Illinois takeover statute.
185. The registration requirements for an exchange offer tinder the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77f (1976), and the rules governing proxy solicitation, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a)-(c) (1976),
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14b-1 (1980), either impose mandatory waiting periods, see, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1976) (registration not effective until 20 days after filing); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
6 (1980) (proxies must be filed 10 days prior to dissemination), or create the potential for delay.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b)(1976) (SEC may delay registration indefinitely). Moreover, as
proxy solicitations are frequently an adjunct to transactions requiring shareholder approval, they
are subject to the more extensive delay inherent under state corporation acts. See note 184 supra.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1976). See also, 133 CONG. REC. 855 (Jan. 18, 1967) (remarks
of Sen. Williams).
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case."' 87 Although the ensuing delay might encourage other offerors to make
a higher bid,8 8 no national interest would be served by having one offeror
succeed rather than another. Shareholders would benefit and commerce
would be stimulated by permitting the best offer to be accepted.
Nevertheless, the analogy between conventional takeover methods and
tender offers is limited. Mergers and proxy contests are corporate matters
which are of peculiar interest to the charter state, and the federal govern-
ment will intrude only to the extent necessary to protect shareholders. In
comparison, the regulation of takeovers may be beyond the political compe-
tency of the states because tender offers often affect shareholders scattered
throughout the United States and abroad.8 9 If the target company is incor-
porated in another state, the basis for regulating the tender offer is difficult
to justify. 1 0 Jurisdiction based on substantial assets within the state or a
minimum number of resident shareholders could be claimed by a diversity of
states.' 9" Thus, the likelihood of multiple laws regulating a single transac-
tion, even if compliance were possible, could create precisely the chaotic
condition envisioned by the Seventh Circuit. 9 2 The potential for balkaniza-
tion that could result from diverse and concurrent state takeover statutes is
properly a ground for concern. 193
187. S. REP. No. 550, supra note 38, at 3.
188. See State Takeover Statutes, supra note 21, at 902 nn.213-14. A well publicized example
is the recent takeover of Conoco. See FORTUNE, Sept. 7, 1981, at 58-64.
189. See Langevoort, supra note 7, at 241-46. In MITE the target company was owned by
2,181 shareholders of which only 589 were residents of Illinois. 633 F.2d at 488.
190. However, the Supreme Court long ago held that a corporation organized in one state,
seeking to do business in nother, may be required to qualify under the latter's "foreign
corporation" laws before doing business there. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519
(1839). See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. Cl. 32, §§ 157.102-125 (1979).
191. See, e.g., ILL. REV: STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.52-10 (1979).
192. The court was concerned that any state could block a tender offer even if all the other
states involved enthusiastically endorsed it. 633 F.2d at 502. Moreover, a comity provision would
be no panacea in cases where the charter state, or some other state with a superior interest, had
no takeover act. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). In that
case the target was a publicly owned Washington corporation. Though Washington itself did not
have a takeover statute, and Maryland and New York both had possible bases for asserting
jurisdiction, Idaho's takeover act ultimately prevailed.
193. When the commerce clause was drafted, the Confederation had been suffering from the
tendency of each state to seek its own narrowly conceived economic self-interest. The urgent
need for uniformity was accomplished in the new Constitution by entrusting the commerce
power to the federal government. But Congress alone could not address every instance of
incompatible state legislation, and it became necessary for the federal judiciary to assume an
active role in assuring that "'every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by
the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation .... H.P. Hood & Sons
v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525,539 (1949). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 110, at 319-22. Thus,
whenever conflicting state regulations actually foreclose the pursuit of some economic activity,
they are most vulnerable to constitutional attack. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,
359 U.S. 520 (1959) (conflicting mudguard regulations in Illinois and Arkansas made compliance
impossible for interstate carriers passing through both states).
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It does not follow, however, that any attempt by the states to regulate
tender offers necessarily runs afoul of the commerce clause. 194 In the case of
the Illinois Act, concern about its overly broad jurisdictional reach provides
the only solid justification for striking it down as violative of the commerce
clause.' 95 If the statute extended exclusively to target companies incorporated
in Illinois the principal constitutional objection to its application would not
exist.199 Without those provisions which authorize control over nondomestic
corporations, the Illinois Act would comport with the body of state corpora-
tion laws, which historically have justified the charter state regulating the
internal affairs of its corporations anywhere in the nation.
If state takeover laws were uniformly administered by the charter state, a
great deal of uncertainty would be alleviated. 9 7 Bidders would face, at most,
two levels of compliance when contemplating a tender offer. The Williams
Act would assure minimal disclosure and substantive protection for the
benefit of shareholders nationwide. This could be supplemented according to
the incorporating state's perception of its particular protective requirements.
Such an approach would hardly be novel. Presently, investors who purchase
shares in a company are automatically subject to regulation by the charter
state in matters affecting the internal affairs of a corporation.' 98 Conven-
tional mergers and the sale of substantial corporate assets are two such
matters which are subject to state regulation and closely analogous to the
tender offers governed by the Williams Act.""' Moreover, concurrent state
194. Under contemporary standards a showing of actual conflict is probably necessary before
local regulations will be struck down. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362
U.S. 440 (1960).
195. Several courts, deciding that a local takeover law was unconstitutional, found it unneces-
sary to strike down the entire state law. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206
(D.N.J. 1981) (antifraud provisions of New Jersey Act upheld); Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich.
App. 51, 302 N.W.2d 596 (1981) (provisions of Michigan act regarding corporations with less
than $1,000,000 in assets or fewer than 500 shareholders and fraud protection upheld).
196. If ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, § 137.52-10(1) (1979) (10% of target company's shares held
by Illinois residents), § 137.52-10(2)(a) (target company's principal executive office in Illinois),
and § 137.52-10(2)(c) (10% of target company's capital in Illinois) are excluded, the remaining
provision would define "target company" as one organized under Illinois law. Id.
§ 137.52-10(2)(b).
197. As it stands now, it may be difficult to know in advance which one or more state laws
will be asserted over a particular tender offer. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.,
443 U.S. 173 (1979). For a discussion of Kidwell see note 171 supra.
198. "Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsi-
bilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
199. Tender offers, mergers, and the sale of corporate assets are merely alternative methods
for shifting control of a business. The last two are typically governed by state corporation acts,
and are subject as well to federal proxy regulations when shareholder votes are solicited. See
notes 184-85 supra. By making local tender offer regulation part of a state's corporation act, the
state could more properly exercise control over the corporate transaction, leaving the Williams
Act to secure adequate protection for investors in the nation's securities markets.
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jurisdiction over tender offers does not necessarily result in a more onerous
burden on interstate commerce than those burdens already tolerated in other
takeover methods. 2'"' As long as the state laws are applied evenhandedly, 20 1
the state should be free to regulate takeovers of their own corporations.
BEYOND MITE
A fundamental difficulty in assessing the impact of MITE on state
takeover acts is that the case was decided under the old rules promulgated
pursuant to the Williams Act. 2112 These rules were extensively revised, and the
revisions became effective shortly after the events in MITE occurred. 20 3 In
their present form the new rules represent a unilateral effort by the SEC to
directly preempt state takeover laws. 2 4 The effect of the new rules, primar-
ily Rule 14d-2(b), is to cause a tender offer to commence immediately upon
disclosure of certain prescribed information. 2111 In contrast, most state laws
provide for mandatory pre-offer disclosure and a waiting period. 20 1 The state
disclosure requirement triggers the tender offer under the SEC rule, while
under state law, the offer is held in abeyance. Consequently, compliance
with both the SEC rule and state law is impossible.
The resulting conflict means that under the supremacy clause, state
takeover laws must yield to the SEC rules. Providing the rules were properly
within the scope of the Commission's rule-making authority, they have the
force and effect of law, hence they are binding on the states. 20 7 Only if the
200. Under state corporation acts the charter state generally has jurisdiction over the internal
affairs of a corporation wherever it is located. See Shipman, supra note 7, at 741-45; note 198
supra. The potential for some burdening of interstate commerce presently exists. It is thus
unclear why state tender offer regulations pose either an inherent or unique threat to interstate
commerce greater in kind or degree than that which currently inheres in other types of state blue
sky or corporate regulation.
201. The commerce clause test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970),
should be applied to assure evenhanded application. See note 167 supra.
202. See note 35 stpra.
203. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to -101 (1980), promulgated Dec. 6, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,340,
effective as to tender offers commenced on or after Jan. 7, 1980. The tender offer in MITE was
published on Feb. 5, 1979. 633 F.2d at 489.
204. See note 125 supra.
205. A tender offer may be initiated by: (1) long form publication, (2) summary advertise-
ment, (3) sending copies of the offer to shareholders, or (4) some other means. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240. 14d-2(a)(1980). If a public announcement is made concerning a prospective tender offer, it
may be deemed to commence immediately if it identifies the bidder, the target company, and
the price and number of shares involved. However, an offer commenced in this way can be
retracted within five days. Id. § 240.14d-2(b)(c). Notice, however, that these rules apply only to
cash tender offers or offers for which the consideration consists of exempt securities tinder the
1933 Act. Hence, a tender offer that is 95% percent for cash and 5% for non-exempt securities
would not be affected by the rule. Canadian Pac. Enterprises (U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F.
Supp. 1192, 1195 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
206. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
207. Under the force and effect of law doctrine, agency regulations implementing federal
statutes preempt conflicting state law under the supremacy clause. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 295-96 (1979).
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SEC exceeded its authority in promulgating the new rules can their effect be
challenged. In this respect the SEC's authority "to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate" is undeniable. 28 But it is
also true that "[t]he rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency
charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make
law. Rather, it is 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will
of Congress as expressed by the statute."'209 The difficult question, therefore,
is whether the will of Congress in enacting the Williams Act went so far as to
allow the SEC to independently exclude state participation in tender offer
regulation.
A literal interpretation of the statute and decisional law might lead to the
conclusion that Congress intended the SEC to have such authority. Such was
the result in one case where, after carefully demonstrating the statutory basis
for Rule 14d-2(b) and the extensive deliberations that went into its formula-
tion, the court concluded that the rule was valid because it was neither
arbitrary nor capricious. 2 10 The court felt justified in reaching this conclusion
despite evidence that the SEC was not really concerned with whether an
advanced filing requirement was needed, except insofar as it created a
preemptive conflict. 21' Another court in the same district, however, severely
criticized the SEC for arrogating to itself the supposed power, unexercised by
Congress, to engage in wholesale preemption when principles of federalism
mandated that unnecessary conflict be avoided. 212
The opinion in the latter case suggests that implicit limitations on an
agency's rule-making authority exist, particularly in light of the tenth
amendment. 21 3 It is contrary to the spirit of our system of dual sovereignty to
permit an agent of the federal government to have independent power to
thwart state legislation. Even congressional power to preempt is ameliorated
in that members of the House and the Senate are locally elected and presum-
ably sensitive to state interests. 21 4 The SEC, on the other hand, has a rela-
208. Section 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976), was
among the statutory authority identified by the SEC as justifying the adoption of Rule 14d-2(b).
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 34-16384, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (Dec. 6, 1979).
209. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976).
210. Canadian Pac. Enterprises (U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
211. Id. at 1195. Mr. Francis Wheat, a former commissioner of the SEC, testified that the
Commission was primarily concerned with imposing preemption for preemption's sake, and that
the lack of any factual data or studies in support of Rule 14d-2(b) reinforced this conclusion. Id.
212. Ohio v. SEC, [1980-81] FED SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,286 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 1980).
213. U.S. CONST. amend. X, provides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
214. In the years before the Constitution was finally ratified, the states were extremely
reluctant to give up any portion of their sovereignty. In seeking to quell popular misgivings about
the creation of a strong central government, Madison pointed out that each of the principal
branches of the federal government would be dependent on the will of the states. Their
accountability to a local electorate would prevent the President or legislature from becoming too
overbearing. TuE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 236 (J. Madison) (M. Beloff ed. 1948). Even after
ratification of the Constitution, concern for the potential abuses that could spring from a strong
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:989
tively free rein to set the limits of its own power. 215 Congress has not
specifically excluded concurrent state legislation with regard to the Williams
Act, despite persistent recommendations for such a amendment. 216 In fact,
section 28(a) of the 1934 Act strongly supports the proposition that concur-
rent state legislation is not prohibited in the field of tender offers. 217 In view
of the past deference exercised by Congress and the Supreme Court towards
the traditional role of the states in the field of corporate regulation, 2I the
SEC's unilateral abridgement of that role is certainly questionable.
Nevertheless, the validity of Rule 14d-2(b) and its preemptive effect, has
generally been accepted by the courts. 211 In turn, the states have manifested
a strong concern for assuring the continued validity of their takeover stat-
utes. Wisconsin, Indiana, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, for example, have
taken steps to harmonize local takeover laws with the Williams Act. 2 0
central government was an important impetus in the passage of the Bill of Rights. These were
viewed as limitations on federal power that needed to be expressed, whereas the states themselves
were confident of their own ability to prevent abuses at the local level. See generally J.
CHANDLER, GENESIS AND BIRTi OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1924).
215. An independent federal regulatory agency, like the SEC, has wide-ranging discretion to
act within the field it regulates. Judicial oversight of agency action is limited to the extent that
"(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976). Moreover, the Supreme Court has been willing to give
independent agencies free rein to pursue their own policies, even to the point of allowing an
agency to substitute its own judgement for such legislative guidance as Congress had provided.
FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953). In reviewing agency action the
Supreme Court has been more disposed to intervene in the face of some procedural irregularity
rather than a lack of substantive authority. 0. STEPnENS & C. RATIIJEN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND TIlE ALLOCATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PowER 494-96 (1980). See generally I K. DAVIs,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3:1-13 (1978).
The President is likewise limited in the influence he can exercise over an independent agency.
Though he appoints commissioners with the advice and consent of the Senate, an early case held
that he cannot remove a commissioner simply on the basis of a difference in political views.
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Congress itself exercises primary control over administrative discretion through the general
standards and procedural safeguards it builds into its enabling statutes. But in an effort to retain
this control after administrative authority has already been granted, Congress is increasingly
favoring the use of a congressional veto to foreclose undesirable agency action. The constitution-
ality of such a device has been widely debated though not yet definitively established. See
generally Bruff & Cellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369 (1977); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto:
Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Schwartz, The Legislative
Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978).
216. See note 125 supra.
217. See note 123 supra.
218. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (SEC Rule 10b-5,
15 U.S.C. § 78j, should not be expanded so as to preempt state statute regulating short-form
mergers).
219. See note 5 supra. See generally McCauliff, supra note 124; Note, The Effect of the New
SEC Rules on the Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 8 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 913
(1979-80); Note, Kneeling to the SEC Rules: The Virginia Takeover Act and The SEC Tender
Offer Rule 14d-2(b), 22 WMs. & MARY L. REV. 487 (1981).
220. See Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 605, F-I (May 27, 1981) and No. 544, A-9 (March
12, 1980). See also id. No. 606, F-I (June 3, 1981) (a recent survey of state takeover laws and
their responses to the latest attacks).
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Furthermore, a uniform solution to the numerous criticisms leveled at the
state laws has been proposed.
The Tender Offer Committee of the North American Securities Adminis-
trators Association has presented the final draft of its State Uniform Take-
Over Act for comment. The proposed act would, among other things, limit a
state's jurisdiction to offers for a company organized under its laws. 22' In
addition, the act would largely eliminate conflict with Rule 14d-2(b) by
conforming the date on which an offer is deemed to "commence" with the
SEC's definition. 2 2 The proposed act, however, retains a provision for hear-
ings and investigations on the fairness of a tender offer by state administra-
tors, 223 similar to the Illinois provision which was invalidated in MITE.22 4
The success of these recent efforts remains to be seen. 2 5
CONCLUSION
Despite a troubled history, the states continue to demonstrate a need for
local tender offer regulation. Whether local takeover acts are constitutionally
valid, however, must be considered apart from their political desirability. It
is one thing to criticize the current patchwork of state laws for obstacles they
raise to the easy use of tender offers in corporate takeover attempts. A certain
lack of uniformity must be expected considering that each state has the
power to devise its own approach to regulating tender offers. But despite the
inconvenience state acts engender, the question of their legality demands an
impartial analysis which isolates those features that are constitutionally in-
firm from those that are merely troublesome. If the Williams Act had been
intended by Congress as the exclusive legislation in this area the result
achieved in MITE would be more justifiable. Congress, however, apparently
left the door open to concurrent state legislation. 2 6 Thus, absent a constitu-
tional defect in the state approach, it remains for Congress alone to close that
door.227
Richard Ryndak
221. State Uniform Take-Over Act § 3(j), reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 602,
K-1 (May 6, 1981).
222. Id. § 3(k).
223. Id. § 6.
224. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
225. During the activity surrounding the recent Conoco takeover, Oklahoma attempted to
"harmonize" its takeover act with Rule 14d-2(b). The first attempt proved unsuccessful because
the Oklahoma Act retained a provision for hearings to determine the fairness of a tender offer,
Relying on the MITE decision, the district court granted a preliminary injunction against the
state act. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [1980-81] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,246, at 91,622 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981). Immediately thereafter, that state adopted a new
takeover statute, effective July 21, 1981, and new implementing regulations. Oklahoma
Takeover Bid Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 431 (West 1981). See SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 614, F-2, 3 (July 29, 1981).
226, See notes 123-62 supra.
227. See Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (upholding the Michigan blue sky law
as a valid exercise of police power). In Merrick, the Court stated, "it may be that there are better
ways to meet the evils at which the statute is directed . . . We can only reply that it is not our
function in decide between measures and upon a comparison of their utility and adequacy
determine their legality." Id. at 589.

